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How the ideas of a specific nation or country can in-
fluence on its position in the world, or on the success of 
the action taken in the international area? How do contem-
porary mass media create public opinion in the desirable 
direction and how does this opinion influence on relation-
ships not only between various institutional subjects, but 
also between ordinary people? Did polarized arrangement 
of international relations in the USSR period constitute an 
inherited phenomenon, which reflected constant opinion-
forming tendencies of civilizations, which were intensified 
by a new ideology? Or did it belong to completely new 
mental and political reality? In order to answer these ques-
tions, it is worth taking an in-depth look, treating Russia 
as an example, into the essence of political myths, their 
role in contemporary politics, and consequences of such 
a phenomenon. A starting point of deliberations included in 
this dissertation is an assumption that a common political 
myth is treated as a tool used in various social and political 
spheres as well as international.
As opposed to an ideology, which is conceptually jus-
tified and comprises of a clear textual structure, the myth 
constitutes a specified informational statement, which 
shape and content might be changed. Marian Golka pays 
attention to the fact that myths are marked with subjectiv-
ity, however, there are restrictions concerning the possibil-
ity of verifying to what extent the content of myths is true1. 
Taking it into consideration, a political myth can be charac-
terized as a phenomenon, which occurs while interpreting 
political reality, consisting of various archetypes function-
ing in collective or individual consciousness in a complex 
and hierarchized way. For the reason that archetypes con-
stitute a basis of the myths, myths contain emotional char-
acter, which is connected with ingrained consciousness’ 
needs that create myths’ overvaluation. Myth scholars also 
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pay attention to the fact that most of myths have a primitive 
depictable semantical structure and they are directed to the 
mass audience.
Because of the way the content is organized within the 
political myth, two levels can be distinguished. On the first 
level myth is built by a set of archetypes, which Gustav 
Jung calls collective unconsciousness. The latter level is 
dependent on the historical reality, in which first-level ar-
chetypes are decoded and stereotypical knowledge is cre-
ated consisting of the content, emotional attitudes and other 
forms of consciousness. The archetype, which is adapted 
to the present time, becomes a stereotype. Undoubtedly, 
rational factors dominate on that level. Group’s conscious-
ness ‘adapts’ a set of archetypes for the political reality and 
creates interpretive pretences. Such stereotypes, which were 
shaped by the set of archetypes, reflect human individuality, 
historical features and gravity of specific historical events. 
It should be emphasized that collective consciousness of 
most social groups is, practically always, confused and 
lacks critical intellectual restraints. For that fact, society 
is susceptible to manipulation, sudden changes of political 
beliefs or social attitudes, even to extreme extent2. 
A classification of political myths can be made on the 
basis of various criteria. Because of the emotional meaning, 
political myths can be divided into positive, negative and 
neutral. Examples of using negative myths can be observed 
in the history of humankind. Such myths were usually used 
to create both inward, and outward enemy’s image in or-
der to encourage society. Currently, creation of political 
myths constitutes a main tool in election campaigns. The 
‘Irish economic miracle’ can be provided as an example 
of such a Polish political myth. Due to, previously men-
tioned, overvaluative character of myths resulting from the 
archetypal basis, most of society ‘buys’ such myths and 
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transposes them into political attitudes. Gustave Le Bon 
introduces an element, which intensifies social persuasion, 
i.e. a mechanism of repetitiveness: ‘Thanks to repetition, 
expressed views may penetrate into crowd’s soul and, 
eventually, regardless of the fact whether they are under-
stood or not, might be admitted that they are indisputably 
true. [...] Constantly reading in a daily paper that, even as 
if it was an impudent slander, A is an absolute bastard and 
B is a decent person, we will eventually believe that such 
statements are true. Of course, on condition that we do not 
read any other daily sharing an opposite view’3. Neutral 
myths are a combination of positive and negative myths. 
A slogan, which was popular in the USSR period, is an ex-
ample of the neutral myth: ‘We will build socialist society 
on condition that we destroy all the enemies’.
Owing to the subject of mythologization, internal and 
external myths can by distinguished. Internal myths re-
volve around the specific nation, country, local commu-
nity; i.e. they are not directed towards an internal recipi-
ent, but they concern domestic personalities, phenomena 
and socio-political news. External myths usually concern 
foreign phenomena and subjects, which belong to differ-
ent cultural and civilizational field. The process of creation 
of external myths does not have to be accompanied by the 
usefulness of the social engineering action. For example, 
the interpretation of foreign local communities’ history is 
always exposed to the risk of mythologization. A wrong 
reception of phenomena occurring in a foreign culture 
might be a source of many political myths, which will per-
manently become a part of consciousness of community, 
which the recipient come from. In that case, a mechanism 
of infectiousness appears, which results from the need for 
life in accordance with accepted customs and social atti-
tudes4. That case determines occurrence of new and old 
myths. Therefore, short-term and long-term myths can be 
distinguished with reference to durability.
Considering usefulness of the action a criterion of iden-
tity, constructive and destructive political myths can be 
mentioned. Constructive myths are used to justify existing 
situation or to assess the usefulness of actions taken by the 
authorities, while destructive myths are used to query cur-
rent political situation in order to suggest changing system, 
government or president etc. Golka rightly noticed that 
‘some myths maintain the image of allegedly ideal political 
reality, but others might help to query them’5. 
Deliberations on political myths are crucial, because 
they allow to understand how mechanisms influence not 
only on the social consciousness, but also on the public 
opinion, which matters significantly in the process of creat-
ing international relations6. Most of scholars agree with the 
opinion that political myths, in accordance with previously 
mentioned factors, play a significant role in social and po-
litical life. Irrationalism of the political myth does not cause 
its destruction in the period of the information society. On 
the contrary, by referring to subconscious, hidden stimuli of 
human psyche and its simplicity, the myth is easily adopted 
in collective consciousness of society. The ‘unfulfillment’ 
of the clairvoyant myth created by politicians for the pur-
pose of the election campaign does not discourage anyone, 
due to the fact that its role was fulfilled at the moment of 
its creation. Elation caused by an idea of ‘a glowing future’ 
brings relief to social feelings. Identical situation can be 
observed with reference to the external myth – ‘we have an 
enemy, but we defeat it’ – on such a basis we create mono-
lithic society and identify ourselves with high value7. 
By referring to Russia, the process mythologization 
might have been noticed in the Middle Ages and its ef-
fects lasted until the present. Thanks to research concern-
ing myths of Russia and Russians, Wladimir Medynski 
provides both reasons for their creation, and their origins8. 
In his opinion, myths of Russia have foreign origins and 
they were created at the beginning of the early modern pe-
riod. Tradesmen’s and diplomats’ memories, especially the 
Dutch’s and Germans’, constitute the origin of myths of 
Russians’ trade unfairness and their tendencies to frauds. 
Such memories were provided by Siegmund Freiherr von 
Herberstein (1486–1566), Heinrich von Staden (1542–
15??) and Koenraad van Klenk (1628–1691)9. All of them 
were neither righteous, nor fair in trade relations, which 
influenced on the creation of myths. Together with descrip-
tion of Russian unfairness, Siegmund Freiherr von Herber-
stein described how he had cheated three Russian traders 
and left Moscow with their property10. Mythologizational 
tendencies were intensified in the 19th century and they 
progressed over the course of history. In 1839 Astolphe-
Louis-Léonor Marquis de Custine, who did not know much 
about Russia, said that it is a wild, almost Asian country, 
and ‘Siberia begins on east of the Vistula river’11.
It is worth mentioning that mythologizational processes 
concerning Russia can be observed in every historical pe-
riod to the present day. Nowadays, we may observe unprec-
edented phenomenon: a mythologizational tendency meets 
with a demythologizational tendency. Latest books treating 
of Russia in historical and present contexts constitutes an 
example of such contradictory tendencies. As an example 
of a mythologizational tendency we can provide a book 
written by British journalist Edward Lucas The New Cold 
War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and West12, 
which was firstly published in 2008 in London, and in the 
same year it was published in Poland13. Although it is not 
an academic publication, it deserves attention owing to the 
subject, which revolves around Russia’s role in the modern 
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world as well as chances and threats resulting from the po-
sition of Russia.
 In the Preface to corrected printing the author ex-
pressed the main point of his book –political repressions 
occur in Russia, whereas Russia presents aggression to-
wards the international community, which did not meet 
with an appropriate reaction from the West14. The Cauca-
sian conflict was the reason for implementing corrections 
by Lucas. Therefore, he presented main points of his book 
and referred to events from August 2008 in the Preface and 
in the Introduction as well. Nowadays, most of his judg-
ments are outdated, while some expressions turned out to 
be wrong, e.g. considering Russia an aggressor in the Cau-
casian conflict15. From the very beginning, it was very hard 
to find which side of the conflict is guilty. That region was 
under the influence of various civilizations and cultures for 
ages, and its history consists of many conflicts and internal 
tensions16. For these reasons, any attempts to find which 
side is right are doomed to fail.
Other arguments found by Lucas, which justify the main 
idea, are connected with the way Russian policy is pursued, 
i.e. ‘a policy which rejected Western values, such as: politi-
cal freedom, rule of law, separation of powers, free press and 
individual rights’17. According to the author, such an idea 
does not stand in contradiction to the fact that ‘the Kremlin 
is a strong supporter of globalization’18. On the contrary, it 
shows that Russians’ attitude to politics has changed: they 
realized that money is the main value of the free world and, 
thanks to rules of the free market, it is the most successful 
political weapon. It is worth mentioning that despite attempts 
to distinguish such notions as ‘the Kremlin’, ’Russia’, ‘Rus-
sians’, Lucas removes limits between them and he combines 
them in one semantic category. The disadvantage of the style 
of deliberations is the fact that the author is strongly attached 
to clamorous language of mass media, which consists of 
many pejorative expressions, such as hypocrisy, paranoia 
and the like. It makes it difficult to interpret author’s inten-
sions in several fragments and sometimes it is hard to distin-
guish sarcasm from objective criticism.
The main point of Lucas’ book allows to express the 
statement that, after the resignation of Boris Yeltsin, the 
new Cold War between Russia and countries support-
ing Western values will come. In that war Russia looks 
for ‘their own way basen on controlled political system, 
strong presidency and a hard-line position on the matter 
of the outside world’19. Although, according to the author, 
the new Cold War is made with the help of financial in-
struments, especially in the field of fuels, Lucas also states 
that that war is made in the field of ideology. He speci-
fies that ‘Ideological conflict of the new Cold War takes 
place between Russian nationalism, which is against the 
law, and Western multilateralism, which is in accordance 
with law’20. A characteristic feature of British journalist’s 
attitude to conflicts is the fact that there is no division into 
West and East, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the USSR and 
the USA. Therefore, the background of the conflict is ideo-
logical not political. The author consider following coun-
tries to be conscious or unconscious supporters of Russia: 
Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Germany, Hun-
gary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and Slova-
kia21. Lucas puts West on the opposite site of the conflict, 
defining in that category broad semantic scope, which con-
sists of various semantic areas: philosophical, economical 
and socio-political. To some extent, it might be said that the 
USA is a heart of this system of values. Some expressions 
in that part of the book contain hyperbolic image of reality 
and they do not bear criticism such as comparison between 
the period of Putin and the period of Andropov. 
Summing up Lucas’ deliberations, it should be men-
tioned that they are under the influence of mythology and, 
sometimes, they create myths, especially pejorative ones. 
Some of deliberations do not bear common-sense criticism 
and shows distance and prejudice of the author. Undoubt-
edly, this book might be considered an origin of mythologi-
zation, which has an effect on international relations.
Written by Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, a French scholar 
focused on Russian issues, a professor of political science 
and a secretary of the French Academy, La Russie entre 
deux is an example of a book revolving around demytholo-
gization. In that book, the author not only depicts Russia 
as a country balancing between two worlds, Europe and 
Asia, but also shows its internal attitude to the surrounding 
world. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 8th 1989 
was the end of the communist period for former satellite 
states of the USRR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact 
and, in general, the end of the 20th century. As d’Encausse 
wrote that ‘for Russians the end of the 20th century was not 
so fast and it did not take place in 1989. The nation remem-
bered two dates, which symbolize death of the old age: 
December 8th 1991, when, as if by magic, the dissolution 
of the USSR took place and December 31st 1999, when 
Boris Yeltsin voluntarily and peacefully resigned (Russia 
was a country, where power was seized by force), ending 
the «transitional» period’22. 
Differences concerning defining the end of the specific 
historical period prove the presence of two different views 
on the history, which constitute grounds for a difference of 
opinion between Russia, which undergoes a painful post-
Communist metamorphosis, and the rest of the world, 
which is convinced of the fact that ‘the disappearance of the 
system, which was created by Lenin, will be identical with 
elimination of all its consequences’23. Together with such 
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a conviction, international community ‘received countries 
from the communist bloc with open arms as if they were 
absent prodigal sons, while Russia was treated with suspi-
cion for a long time by them’ – an analysts states24. 
Should we be afraid of Russia? This question is, ac-
cording to mythologizational tendencies, asked by a French 
academic. In her opinion, the answer is connected with un-
derstanding of Russia’s position, which is based on geo-
graphical factors and attitudinal reasons. D’Encausse states 
that ‘for most of Russians and for those, who rule them, 
Russia is not an Asian country, but an enormous European 
country, which is situated in Asia and due to that fact is 
entitled to be the part of the post-Eastern world. A state of 
being conscious of European identity has never been so 
strong in Russia as in the 21st century’25.
The French academic provides a very interesting state-
ment concerning Caucasian crisis in 2008. What Lucas 
considers the new Cold War, Hélène d’Encausse treats it 
like an opposite fact: ‘Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 
constituted a turnabout. First of all, it was a resignation 
from everything, what Russia considered to be the con-
tinuation or the return to the Cold War. It was also a res-
ignation from the concept of the international life, which 
was determined arbitrarily without Russia’s participation. 
By taking part in the conflict, Russia clearly suggests that 
it is not a country with doubtful democracy, which inter-
national community might accuse of breaching rules and 
not allowing to do own business, but a fully self-sufficient 
democratic country. [...] By its actions, Russia opposes the 
USA its own indisputable status of a superpower and as-
pires to create a new world in post-Cold War conditions. 
Russia wants to put an end to the situation, in which it is 
in danger of «colorful revolutions», enlargement of NATO, 
or localization of the PRO system near Russian borders’26. 
It should be noticed that such an assessment was made two 
years after the crisis, when the international investigation 
was closed.
The answer for that question can be found in d’Encausse 
conclusion concerning the position of Russia in the modern 
word: ‘Russia’s desire for being both developed, and ethi-
cal country is similar to Russian debates in the 19th cen-
tury. Is not this a sign for us that we should not be afraid of 
Russia, but we should try to understand it and realize that 
Russia, which balances between two words, identifies itself 
with Europe and wants to share its fate with Europe’27.
Will the presence of bipolar tendencies to create images 
of Russia constructively influence on Western countries 
policies towards Russia? We will see in the near future. 
One thing can be taken for granted. If blind admiration of 
Russian society had earlier concerned all the fields of sci-
ence and art, it would take a different direction now. Signs 
of such tendencies can be observed in the field of politics 
and philosophical theological ideas. Now matter how social 
and political life of internal Russia is assessed, everything 
shows that leaders of that country set development priori-
ties and the way, it has to follow in order to achieve them. 
Good relations with Western countries together with re-
spect for national independence and recognition of interna-
tional authority of Russia are elements of this policy. Every 
political strategist cares about the fact that political myths 
and national stereotypes have to be successively eliminated 
with the use of appropriate scientific research and educa-
tion programmes. Amelioration of international relations 
should be an overriding aim of such processes.
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Mity na temat Rosji jako narzędzie perswazji socjo-politycznej
Streszczenie
Mitologizacja jako narzędzie w konstruowaniu polityki międzynarodowej wobec Rosji odegrała i nadal odgrywa 
kluczową rolę w kształtowaniu współczesnej opinii publicznej na świecie na temat tego kraju. Mitologizacja nie jest do 
końca narzędziem sterowanym centralnie. Pojawienie się mitów na temat Rosji i Rosjan niekiedy było spowodowane 
źródła społeczne, zaś ich wyniki zyskały wymiar polityczny. Źródła tych procesów sięgają czasów średniowiecznych 
a ich wpływ można odczuć w dobie współczesnej. 
Rev. Aleksy Kucy 
Myths of Russia as a tool of socio-political persuasion
Summary
Mythologization as a tool of engineering international policy towards Russia has played and still plays a pivotal role 
in modelling the public opinion. Mythologization is not entirely a centrally controlled tool. The emergence of myths about 
Russia and Russians has always followed a bottom-up pattern and its results have been invariably transferred into the 
political dimension. The sources of these processes date back to the medieval times and the onset of the modern era.
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